Abstract. This paper shows that an eavesdropper can always recover efficiently the private key of one of the two parts of the public key cryptography protocol introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov (ACNS 2005, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 3531, pp. 151-163, 2005. Thus an eavesdropper can always recover the shared secret key, making the protocol insecure.
Introduction
Recent advances in public key cryptography have underlined the need to find alternatives to the RSA cryptosystem. It has been proposed to use algorithmic problems in non-commutative group theory as possible ways to build new protocols. The conjugacy search problem was introduced in several papers as a generalization of the discrete logarithm problem in the research of a new safe encryption scheme. The former problem asks whether or not, given a group G and two elements a, b ∈ G that are conjugate, we can find at least one x ∈ G with a x := x −1 ax = b. It is thus important to look for a platform group G where this problem is computationally hard. Seminal works by Anshel-Anshel-Godlfeld [1] and Ko-Lee et al. [6] have proposed the braid group B n on n strands as a possible platform group.
It has been observed that Thompson's group F and the braid groups B n have some similarities. Belk proved in his thesis [2] that F and the braid groups have a similar classifying space. Loosely speaking, the elements of F appear as braids, but with merges and splits instead of twists (this representation of F uses strand diagrams which are introduced in [2] ). Dehornoy defined in [4] a group of parenthesized braids which contains both F and B n in a very natural way. However, for cryptographic purposes, F has still not proved to be a good platform. Kassabov and Matucci have proved in [5] that the simultaneous conjugacy problem is efficiently solvable, making it insecure to apply protocols based on the conjugacy problem.
Shpilrain and Ushakov in [9] have proposed using a particular version of the decomposition problem as a protocol and the group F as a platform. The new problem is: given a group G, a subset X ⊆ G and two elements w 1 , w 2 ∈ G with the information that there exist a, b ∈ X such that aw 1 b = w 2 , find at least one such pair a, b. In this paper we show how to recover efficiently the shared secret key of this protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sects. 2 and 3 we recall the protocol and give a description of Thompson's group F . In Sect. 4 we recall the choice of parameters proposed in [9] . In Sect. 5 we give an efficient attack that always recovers the secret key. In Sects. 6 and 7 we show another type of attack. In Sect. 8 we make some comments on possible generalizations of this protocol.
History and Related Works
The first attack on this protocol was announced by Ruinskiy, Shamir and Tsaban in November 2005 at the Bochum Workshop Algebraic Methods in Cryptography, showing that the parameters given in [9] should be increased to have higher security of the system. Their attack was improved in other announcements and was finalized in [7] at the same time that this paper was written. Their attack describes a more general procedure which uses length functions. We remark that the same authors have been developing new techniques involving "subgroup distance functions" and that they applied them on the same protocol for F as a test case [8] . The approach of Ruinskiy, Shamir and Tsaban in their mentioned papers is heuristic, and its success rates are good but not 100%. Our approach is deterministic, and provably succeeds in all possible cases. of F is the following: for I = [0, 1] we define PL 2 (I ) to be the group of piecewise linear homeomorphisms of the interval I with finitely many breakpoints such that:
• All slopes are integral powers of 2, and • All breakpoints are in Z[ 2 ], the ring of dyadic rational numbers; the product of two elements is given by the composition of functions. We thus define F to be the group PL 2 (I ). F can also be described using the following presentation:
This presentation has the advantage that the elements of F can be uniquely written in the following normal form Fig. 1 ). We now introduce a notation which will be useful for the definition of the subgroups A and B. For every positive integer k we call
From the definition of x k , we get Parts (i) and (iii) of the following Lemma are in [9] , while part (ii) is a simple observation.
Lemma 3.3. (i) A s is the set of elements whose normal form is of the type
(iii) Let a ∈ A s and b ∈ B s be such that their normal forms are
Then the normal form of ab is
Theorem 3.4 (Shpilrain-Ushakov [9] ). In Thompson's group F , the normal form of a given word w can be computed in time O(|w| log |w|), where |w| is the length of the normal form in the generators x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . .
Suggested Parameters for the Encryption
We now illustrate briefly the choice of parameters proposed in [9] . Alice and Bob select an integer s ∈ [3, 8] and an even integer M ∈ [256, 320] uniformly and randomly. Moreover, they also choose a random element w ∈ x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x s+2 with |w| = M, where |w| is as in Theorem 3.4. The numbers s, M and the element w are now part of the public data.
To proceed with the protocol described in Sect. 2, Alice chooses random elements a 1 ∈ A s , b 1 ∈ B s , with |a 1 | = |b 1 | = M, while Bob chooses random elements a 2 ∈ A s , b 2 ∈ B s , with |a 2 | = |b 2 | = M. Now they both compute the shared secret key:
Shpilrain and Ushakov remark that this choice of parameters gives a key space which increases exponentially in M, i.e., |A s (M)| ≥ √ 2 M , thereby making it difficult for Eve to perform a brute force attack.
Recovering the Shared Secret Key
We begin this section by providing the theoretical background for the attack. We will use the piecewise-linear point of view to understand why the attack works and then rephrase it combinatorially. We will now describe how Eve, by knowing the elements w, u 1 , u 2 , can always recover one of the two legitimate parties' private keys. She chooses whose key to crack, depending on whether the graph of w is above or below the point (ϕ s , ϕ s ).
Recovering Bob's Private Keys: w(ϕ s ) ≤ ϕ s
Since w(t) ≤ ϕ s for all t ∈ [0, ϕ s ], we observe the following identity
Therefore, Eve may apply w −1 to the left of both sides of the previous equation to obtain
and so w −1 u 2 ∈ A s B s and
Now Eve has the elements a 2 , w and u 2 = b 2 wa 2 and she computes
thereby detecting Bob's private keys and the shared secret key K.
Recovering Alice's Private Key: w(ϕ s ) > ϕ s
Since w −1 (t) < ϕ s for all t ∈ [0, ϕ s ], we have
By applying the same technique as in the previous subsection Eve recovers a
and so
Outline of the Attack
We expand on the previous discussion to describe a combinatorial attack. Assume that Eve has the elements w, u 1 , u 2 . The only point of this procedure which needs further explanation is (2). When we have the normal forms of z 1 , z 2 , we know that one of them is in A s B s . We write the normal form
and we look at the notation of Lemma 3.3(i): we need to find the smallest index r in z i such that either i r+1 or j r+1 does not satisfy the index condition in Lemma 3.3(i). To verify if z i ∈ A s B s , we need to check whether it has the form described in Lemma 3.3(iii): we remove the first r letters and the last r letters of z i from the word and we lower all the indices of the remaining letters by r; if what remains is a word whose indices are in {s + 2, . . . , 2s}, then we have an element of B s , otherwise z i / ∈ A s B s . If z i ∈ A s B s , then a z i will be the product of the first r elements of z i and the last r ones.
Complexity of the Attack
By Theorem 3.4 we know that computing normal forms can be done in time O(M log M), where M is the size of the inputs suggested in Sect. 4. Part (2) of the attack can be executed in time O(M), by just reading the indices of the normal forms and finding when the relation of Lemma 3.3(i) breaks down. Finally, the last steps are just multiplications and then simplifications so they can again be performed in time O(M log M). Therefore, Eve can recover the shared secret key in time O(M log M). Remark 5.1. The previous discussion shows that there is no need to pass from words to piecewise-linear functions and back. The attack can be performed entirely by using the combinatorial point of view which is used for encryption. The piecewise-linear point of view is necessary only to prove that the combinatorial attack works. We also remark that the complexity of the attack is independent of the parameter s.
Transitivity of A s and B s
The previous section showed how to recover the shared secret key of one of the two involved parties, based on whether the graph of w lies above or below the point (ϕ s , ϕ s ). However, it is possible to find the shared secret key even in the cases not studied in the previous section. Proof. A straightforward computation shows that 
Using Transitivity to Attack the Shared Secret Key
With the new description of A s and B s given in Sect. 6, it is now possible to attack the secret keys in the cases left open from Sect. 5.
Attacking Alice's Word for the Case w(ϕ s ) ≤ ϕ s
We have
and so a 1 is uniquely determined in [0, w(ϕ s )]. We apply Corollary 6.5 to find an element a σ ∈ A s such that a σ = a 1 on the interval [0, w(ϕ s )]. If we define
Therefore b σ ∈ B s and a σ wb σ = u 1 and so Eve can recover the shared secret key K by using the pair (a σ , b σ ). (Corollary 6.4) . They can also be solved by using the analogue of Corollary 6.5 for B s to get another pair (a σ , b σ ) which can be used to retrieve the secret key.
Comments and Alternatives to the Protocol
This section analyzes possible alternatives and weaknesses of our methods. We observe that, if instead of PL 2 (I ) we had used a larger group of piecewise linear homeomorphisms of the unit interval, the same technique would have worked, as long as the commuting subgroups A and B had disjoint supports. More generally, we can copy this idea if the given group G acts on some space and we have A, B with disjoint support. We will now see some examples of how this is possible.
Choice of the Subgroups A and B
We recall the following result: (ii) There exist two elements
Going back to the protocol introduced in Sect. 2 we observe that, after we choose a finitely generated subgroup A = f 1 , . . . , f m , we are very restricted in our choice of the subgroup B. Since B ≤ C F (A), we must make sure that the elements of B, when restricted to I r , are powers of common roots of the a i 's, if at least one a i is non-trivial on I r . This gives a tight restriction on the subgroup B whose support is essentially disjoint from that of A, except in the intervals where they all are powers of a common root. An attack similar to that of Sect. 5 can thus be applied on each interval I r : if their supports are disjoint on I r , we can act as before, otherwise elements of A and B are powers of a common root on I r .
With more general commuting subgroups, the attack of Sect. 5 does not immediately give either of the two keys. However, the discussion above suggests that the choice of A and B must be done much more carefully in order to avoid similar attacks.
Alternative Protocol and Attacks
Ko-Lee et al. [6] introduced a slightly different protocol based on the decomposition problem (They worked with braid groups, but we will apply their protocol to Thompson's group). In their protocol, Alice picks a 1 , a 2 ∈ A and sends u 1 = a 1 wa 2 to Bob, while Bob chooses b 1 , b 2 ∈ B and sends u 2 = b 1 wb 2 to Alice. We can still attempt to solve this new protocol, by again dividing the problem into various cases. We assume that we use the same subgroups A s and B s and we work in the case w(ϕ s ) ≤ ϕ s to show how to attack the private keys of Bob. We apply the analogue for B s of Corollary 6.4 and find a b 0 such that b 
A comment on the Alternative Protocol
The weakness in the protocol discussed in the previous subsection arises from the fact that the chosen subgroups A s and B s are transitive on the intervals on which they act nontrivially. This suggests that a possible way to avoid such attacks is for A and B to be chosen to be not transitive on their support.
Remark 8.2.
We observe that the attacks of Sects. 7 and 8 can be carried out in a fashion similar to that of Sect. 5, still producing a solution in polynomial time.
